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INTRODUCTION
The proliferation of new technologies for the transmission of
radio signals has revolutionized the ways the American public
receives information. In addition to broadcast television and radio,
Americans may now obtain information over coaxial cable (cable
TV), Master Antenna Television (MATV), Satellite Master
Antenna Television (SMATV), and Direct Broadcast Satellites
(DBS). This proliferation in methods of delivery has resulted in an
enormous increase in capacity that is quickly being filled by
additional programming. However, in order to receive program-
ming via new radio technologies, individual residences or small
clusters of residences require some form of antenna other than the
conventional broadcast devices that sprouted on chimneys and
rooftops in the 1950s and 1960s.
Localities, in the exercise of their police powers, often have
adopted restrictions on the size and/or placement of these
antennas. Restrictions are enacted for various health, safety, or
aesthetic reasons. Unfortunately, the restrictions may significantly
hinder or completely block the reception of radio signals.
Consequently, these restrictions have created a substantial
controversy between those asserting a right to receive signals and
those who believe communities have a right to regulate land use
in the public interest.
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC or Commis-
sion) attempted to balance these competing interests on several
occasions.' It recognized legitimate reasons for local restrictions
1. See, e.g., In re Federal Preemption of State and Local Regs. Pertaining to
Amateur Radio Facils., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 101 F.C.C.2d 952, para. 25
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on antenna size and location, but it also recognized statutory
objectives supporting rights reasonably necessary to receive
unhindered interstate communications.2 As a result, the Commis-
sion adopted rules that partially preempt local regulations. Through
these rules, the Commission sought to guarantee the reception of
communications signals while allowing municipalities to regulate
when there are justifiable and articulated local objectives.
One such rule that applies to home satellite dishes (HSDs) is
47 C.F.R. § 25.104? Hundreds of thousands of these HSDs,
which are saucers that vary from six to twelve feet in diameter
and have a distinctive, highly visible shape, are believed to be in
operation.4 When the regulation was adopted in 1986, the FCC
cautioned local communities not to discriminate against HSDs in
favor of other types of radio antennas. If municipal ordinances did
single out HSDs for special treatment, they were required to have
clearly articulated health, safety, or aesthetic objectives.' Further-
more, such ordinances could not unduly impede the reception of
satellite signals in terms of cost or other burdens of compliance.'
Because the Commission's HSD rule only partially preempts
local regulations, there have been numerous court challenges to the
legitimacy of local zoning regulations.' Having anticipated this
(1985) (local regulation of amateur, or ham, radio was confined to the "minimum
practicable" to accomplish the local authority's legitimate purpose); see also infra notes
18-19 and accompanying text (discussing preemptive actions concerning MATV and
SMATV).
2. Memorandum Opinion and Order, 101 F.C.C.2d 952, para. 1.
3. Preemption of Local Zoning of Earth Station Antennas, 47 C.F.R. § 25.104
(1993).
4. Direct Testimony and Exhibits of G. Todd Hardy at 11, In re 1991 Satellite
Carrier Rate Adjustment Proceeding (Copyright Royalty Trib. Feb. 6, 1992) (CRT Dkt.
No. 91-3-SCRA); James R. Hobson, Home Satellite Dishes and Other Antennas: The
Local Zoning Threat of "Equal Treatment," CoMM. LAWYER, Summer 1992, at 3, 3.
5. In re Local Zoning or Other Reg. of Receive-Only Satellite Earth Stations,
Report and Order, 59 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1073, paras. 32-34 (1986) [hereinafter Local
Zoning Report and Order].
6. Id. paras. 36-37.
7. See, e.g., Cawley v. City of Port Jervis, 753 F. Supp. 128 (S.D.N.Y. 1990);
Hunter v. City of Whittier, 257 Cal. Rptr. 559 (Ct. App. 1989); Olsen v. City of
Baltimore, 582 A.2d 1225 (Md. 1990); Breeling v. Churchill, 423 N.W.2d 469 (Neb.
1988); Nationwide Satellite Co. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 578 A.2d 389 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1990); Alsar Tech., Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 563 A.2d 83 (N.J.
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problem in its rulemaking, the Commission noted that it did not
intend to become a national zoning board reviewing every
complaint that comes before it.8 Rather, it left the construction
and enforcement of its rules to local institutions and the courts.
Presumably, the Commission envisioned itself as a forum of last
resort if local relief were wrongly denied.9
The Commission's authority to decide cases in the last resort,
however, has recently been called into question by the decision of
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Town
of Deerfield v. FCC ° The Second Circuit held that the Commis-
sion could not place itself in the position of reviewing the decision
of a federal court." Although narrowly applied in Deerfield, the
same reasoning potentially could be expanded to prohibit the
FCC's review of any state or federal court decision.
This Article will evaluate the Second Circuit's decision in
Deerfield and address the options available to the FCC in order to
balance the competing federal and state regulatory interests. Part
I will establish the background leading up to the Deerfield
decision, including FCC and court decisions. Part II will evaluate
Deerfield's reasoning and briefly examine various legal concepts
implicated by this case. Part III will address and evaluate the
remaining FCC options after Deerfield. The conclusion will
recommend the best means available to the Commission to balance
the competing federal and state interests.
Super. Ct. Law Div. 1989); L.I.M.A. Partners v. Borough of Northvale, 530 A.2d 839
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987); Minars v. Rose, 507 N.Y.S.2d 241 (App. Div. 1986);
Cincinnati v. Billing, 558 N.E.2d 85 (Ohio Ct. App.), appeal dismissed, 534 N.E.2d 843
(Ohio 1988).
8. Local Zoning Report and Order, supra note 5, para. 39.
9. See id. para. 40.
10. Deerfield, 992 F.2d 420 (2d Cir. 1993).




A. The FCC's Rulemaking
On April 9, 1985, the FCC adopted a Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking (NPRM) in response to a petition filed by United
Satellite Communications, Inc., for a declaratory ruling preempting
local zoning of satellite receive-only earth stations."2 The petition
cited a Chicago ordinance, allegedly enacted for the purpose of
protecting the local cable franchise. The ordinance required the
approval of three agencies, a public hearing, and a one hundred
dollar application fee in order to install an HSD. 13 These require-
ments were challenged as undue burdens upon the installation of
HSDs. The Commission granted the petition and sought comment
on what authority it possessed to preempt zoning regulations and
what types of regulations should be preempted. 4
The Commission tentatively concluded that it possessed
preemptive authority because local regulation stood as an obstacle
to accomplishing a legitimate congressional purpose. 5 Specifical-
ly, the Commission observed that without satellite antennas the
domestic satellite services licensed by the Commission were
useless.' 6 In addition, the Commission concluded that recent
amendments to the Communications Act reflected a congressional
intent to ensure that Americans without access to cable program-
ming would be able to obtain it. 7 Finally, the Commission
observed that it had previously preempted state regulation that
12. In re Preemption of Local Zoning Regs. of Receive-Only Satellite Earth Stations,
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 100 F.C.C.2d 846 (1985) [hereinafter Local Zoning
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking], adopted sub nom. In re Local Zoning or Other Reg.
of Receive-Only Satellite Earth Stations, Report and Order, supra note 5.
13. Id. para. 3.
14. Id. para. 1.
15. Id. para. 9. For examples of constitutional preemption analyses, see Capital
Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691 (1984); Michigan Canners & Freezers Ass'n
v. Agricultural Marketing and Bargaining Board, 467 U.S. 461 (1984); Florida Lime &
Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963); and Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52
(1941).
16. Local Zoning Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 12, para. 10.
17. Id.
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interfered with the distribution of interstate communications by
MATV systems carrying terrestrial microwave Multipoint
Distribution Service (MDS) programming.' The Commission
also preempted state attempts to apply cable regulation to
SMATV. 9 Thus, the Commission concluded that "excessive state
and local regulation of satellite antennas interferes with a condi-
tional right to receive programming via home earth stations. When
state regulations are unreasonably interfering with or frustrating
this right or the provisions of the Communications Act or
Commission rules ... preemption is warranted." '
In determining the proper scope of its preemption, the
Commission observed that, "Although the proper focus in a
preemption action is not the relative importance to the states of
their own laws, it is incumbent on this Commission to take note
of the traditionally local character of zoning regulation."21 Thus,
the Commission concluded that it "should not unduly interfere
with the legitimate affairs of local governments when they do not
frustrate federal objectives."2 Consistent with this conclusion,
the Commission determined that a complete preemption would be
an unwarranted federal intrusion into legitimate state and local
matters.23
In adopting its final rule, the Commission restated its
conclusions from the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking. It found that
the broad mandates of Section 1 of the Communications Ace4
and a recent amendment to the Communications Ace 5 "create[d]
certain rights to receive unscrambled and unmarketed satellite
18. Id. para. 11 & n.10 (citing In re Orth-O-vision, Inc. Petition for a Declaratory
Ruling, 69 F.C.C.2d 657 (1978), aJf'd sub noma. New York State Comm'n on Cable TV
v. FCC, 669 F.2d 58 (2d Cir. 1982)).
19. Id. para. 12 (citing In re Earth Satellite Comm., Inc. Petition for Expedited
Special Relief and Declaratory Ruling, Memorandum Opinion, Declaratory Ruling and
Order, 95 F.C.C.2d 1223 (1983), aff'd sub nom. New York State Comm'n on Cable TV
v. FCC, 749 F.2d 804 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).
20. Id. para. 10 (footnote omitted).
21. Id.
22. Id. para. 21.
23. Id. para. 10.
24. 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1988).
25. 47 U.S.C. § 705 (1988).
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signals. These statutory provisions establish a federal interest in
assuring that the right to construct and use antennas to receive
satellite delivered signals is not unreasonably restricted by local
regulation. 26 However, the Commission also expressed an intent
to accommodate local interests by only partially preempting local
zoning regulations.27
The regulation adopted by the Commission states:
Preemption of local zoning of earth stations.
State and local zoning or other regulations that differentiate
between satellite receive-only antennas and other types of antenna
facilities are preempted unless such regulations:
(a) Have a reasonable and clearly defined health, safety or
aesthetic objective; and
(b) Do not operate to impose unreasonable limitations on, or
prevent, reception of satellite delivered signals by receive-only
antennas or to impose costs on the users of such antennas that are
excessive in light of the purchase and installation cost of the
equipment.
Regulation of satellite transmitting antennas is preempted in
the same manner except that state and local health and safety
regulation is not preempted.2"
The Commission clearly warned that, in adopting this
regulation, it did not intend to operate as a national zoning
board.29 It reached this conclusion after finding that there had
been increased interest and publicity surrounding this issue and
that the large number of cases that might be presented for
individual review would place a severe burden on the administra-
tive process.3" The Commission did, however, leave open the
prospect that it "would entertain requests for further action if it
appears that local authorities are generally failing to abide by our
standards."31 The Commission required any party requesting
review to demonstrate that it had exhausted all other remedies.32
26. Local Zoning Report and Order, supra note 5, para. 23.
27. Id. paras. 32, 34, 43.
28. 47 C.F.R. § 25.104 (1993).
29. Local Zoning Report and Order, supra note 5, para. 39.
30. Id.
31. Id. para. 40.
32. Id.
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B. The Exhausting Carino Saga
In 1987 the town of Deerfield, New York, attempted to
enforce its zoning regulations against Joseph Carino, a resident
whose lot was less than one-half acre.33 The regulations restricted
the placement of satellite antennas, providing:
B. Dish or Tower Type Antennae:
General Regulations:
a. In R-l or R-2 District no dish or tower type antennae shall
be erected on any lot less than one-half (1/2) acre.
b. No dish or tower type antennae shall be located in a front
yard or comer lot fronting on more than one street.
c. No dish or tower type antennae shall be erected on any lot
without the issuance of a building permit by the enforcement
officer(s) and subject to the following so as to be cosmetically
acceptable for all adjoining landowners:
1. All towers and antennae shall have setbacks from any lot
line equal to or greater than the height of the proposed
structure, but in any case not less than thirty (30) feet.
2. Only one such structure shall exist at any one time on
any lot or parcel.
3. The applicant shall present documentation of the posses-
sion of any required federal or state license.
4. The owner of such a structure shall assume complete
liability in case of personal or property damage.
d. Dish Type-special regulations:
1. No part twelve (12) feet above ground level.
2. Projected area:
Solid type-51 square feet
Mesh type-80 square feet. 4
After the Deerfield Zoning Board of Appeals announced its
intention to enforce this regulation against Carino, he wrote the
FCC asking for help. The Commission responded in a letter,
which directed Carino's attention to the Commission's regulation
codified at 47 C.F.R. § 25.104 and further advised him to use the
rule to "pursue legal remedies on a local level., 36 In addition, the
33. Town of Deerfield v. FCC, 992 F.2d 420, 424 (2d Cir. 1993).
34. Id. at 423-24 (quoting DEERFIELD, N.Y., ZONING ORDINANCE § 17(B) (1986)).
35. Id. at 424 (citing Letter from Joseph A. Carino to Chief, Satellite Radio Branch,
FCC (Feb. 28, 1987)).
36. Letter from Chief, Satellite Radio Branch, FCC, to Joseph A. Carino (Mar. 20,
1987), quoted in Deerfield, 992 F.2d at 424.
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Commission restated its intention not to function as a national
zoning board that would "offer legal opinions with respect to
individual problems."37 While recognizing that "communities are
generally failing to abide by our standards," '38 the Commission
declared that "[r]equests for relief under the Commission's rule
must demonstrate that all other remedies including legal action
with the assistance of private counsel have been pursued and
exhausted."'39
Carino accepted the Commission at its word and embarked on
a five-year journey that eventually brought him full circle back to
the Commission. The journey began when Carino appealed the
zoning board's decision to the New York state courts, where he
raised several arguments including preemption of the zoning
regulation pursuant to 47 C.F.R. § 25.104.4° The New York State
Supreme Court denied Carino's petition in its entirety. With
respect to the preemption claim, the court found that the regulation
"does not differentiate between satellite receive-only facilities and
other antennas, it applies to both dish and tower type antennas."'
Thus, the court concluded that the zoning ordinance was not
preempted because it did not discriminate against satellite-dish
antennas. 42 This decision was affirmed by the Appellate Division
for substantially the same reasons.43 The New York state court
decisions are hereinafter collectively referred to as Carino L
In a last-ditch effort to obtain relief, Carino took his case to
the federal courts.44 There, the Town of Deerfield asserted that
Carino was collaterally estopped from arguing preemption because
the issue had been fully and fairly litigated and necessarily
decided in the state court actions. The district court agreed and
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. (Deerfield's emphasis).
40. Deerfield, 992 F.2d at 425.
41. Id. (quoting state supreme court's memorandum denying Carino's petition).
42. Id. (citing state supreme court's memorandum denying Carino's petition).
43. Carino v. Pilon, 530 N.Y.S.2d 1022 (App. Div.), appeal dismissed, 531 N.E.2d
655 (N.Y. 1988). Carino did not petition the United States Supreme Court for review.
44. Carino v. Town of Deerfield, 750 F. Supp. 1156 (N.D.N.Y. 1990), aff'd, 940
F.2d 649 (2d Cir. 1991).
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held that it was required to honor the state court decisions under
the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the U.S. Constitution.45 This
determination was upheld by the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit.46 The first round of federal court deci-
sions is hereinafter collectively referred to as Carino II
Having exhausted his local remedies, Carino returned to the
Commission in January 1991 to seek a declaratory ruling that the
Deerfield zoning ordinance was preempted by 47 C.F.R. §
25.104.47 The Commission noted that Carino had done everything
required in pursuit of local relief.48
Deerfield once again raised the defense of collateral estoppel.
It argued:
Although the F.C.C. has discretion in determining issues within its
jurisdiction, it is still bound by the law and it must respect final
decisions of competent courts, at least as the decisions apply to the
original parties to judicial proceedings. It is not within the power of
the F.C.C. to act as a court of last resort to review judicial
determinations.... Merely by retaining jurisdiction in this matter
the Commission has placed itself in the position of reviewing the
decision of a higher court. Such a power has obviously not been
granted to the Commission by Congress.49
The Commission accepted jurisdiction and determined that
the ordinance was indeed overly restrictive and thus preempted. 0
The Commission refused to give collateral estoppel or res judicata
effect to the federal court decisions because there had been no
federal court ruling on the merits, nor had the prior federal court
decisions addressed whether Carino was estopped from "bringing
the Deerfield ordinance to the FCC's attention."5 Furthermore,
45. Id. at 1162 (citing Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75,
81 (1984)); see also U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
46. Carino v. Town of Deerfield, 940 F.2d 649 (2d Cir. 1991).
47. In re Preemption of Satellite Antenna Zoning Ordinance of Town of Deerfield,
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 7 FCC Rcd. 2172 (1992) [hereinafter Deerfield
Memorandum Opinion and Order].
48. Id. para. 8 n.16.
49. Motion to Accept Late Filed Comments by Town of Deerfield para. 4, In re
Petition of Joseph A. Carino for a Declaratory Ruling Preempting the Satellite Dish
Antenna Zoning Ordinance of the Town of Deerfield, N.Y. (July 24, 1991) (FCC Dkt.
No. DA 91-145).
50. Deerfield Memorandum Opinion and Order, supra note 47, para. 8.
51. Id. para. 20.
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even if collateral estoppel would ordinarily apply, the Commission
concluded that its application in this case would be unfair to
Carino since he was only following the Commission's instruc-
tions.52
The Town of Deerfield appealed the FCC's order to the
Second Circuit, arguing that the Commission's failure to give
collateral estoppel effect to the prior state and federal court
judgments was in error.5 3 The FCC defended its order on the
grounds that (1) it had discretion to disregard the prior judgments,
(2) collateral estoppel was not applicable because this was an issue
of law rather than fact, (3) application of collateral estoppel would
be unfair to Carino, and (4) the FCC should make the final
determination of preemption because of its particular expertise.' 4
The Second Circuit reversed the Commission, but on grounds
somewhat different from those briefed or argued by either
party. The FCC elected not to appeal this decision.56
H. THE SECOND CIRCUIT'S DECISION REVERSING THE FCC
A. The Ruling in Brief
Rather than agreeing with the Town of Deerfield's argument
that the Commission was collaterally estopped from deciding the
52. Id. paras. 21-23. The Commission did not specifically address the collateral
estoppel effect of the state court determinations. The question of whether a state court
decision can have res judicata or collateral estoppel effect in a subsequent proceeding
before an administrative agency is unsettled. This issue is discussed in more detail infra
part II.C.1.
53. Town of Deerfield v. FCC, 992 F.2d 420, 426-27 (2d Cir. 1993).
54. Id. at 427.
55. Id. at 428 (focusing on separation of powers doctrine rather than res judicata
issues argued by the parties).
56. Three weeks after the court's opinion, however, the Commission called for
public comment on three related matters: (1) the effect of the Second Circuit opinion on
the FCC's HSD rules and practice; (2) a Hughes Network Systems petition for complete
preemption of local zoning restrictions on satellite dishes of two meters or smaller in
commercial and industrial zones; and (3) an earlier petition of the Satellite Broadcasting
and Communications Association, where the record stood in need of updating.
Comments Sought on Preemption of Local Zoning Reg. of Satellite Antennas, Public
Notice, 8 FCC Red. 3576 (1993). This tripartite proceeding had not been resolved as of
April 1994.
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Carino case, the Second Circuit ruled that the FCC's decision
rendered the prior federal court decisions merely advisory, in
violation of the Case or Controversy Clause of Article III of the
Constitution.57
The Second Circuit discussed at length the allocation of
judicial power under the Constitution. Citing cases from the
earliest days of the United States, the court focused upon the Case
or Controversy Clause, which prohibits Congress from requiring
an Article III court to "express an opinion on a case where its
judicial power could not be exercised, and where its judgment
would not be final and conclusive upon the rights of the par-
ties."58 The court held:
A judgment entered by an Article IIH court having jurisdiction to
enter that judgment is not subject to review by a different branch of
government, for if a decision of the judicial branch were subject to
direct revision by the executive or legislative branch, the court's
decision would in effect be merely advisory. 9
Next, the court determined that an administrative agency may not
simply choose to ignore federal court judgments.6 ° Finally, the
court concluded that federal courts are required by statute to
accord state court judgments "the same full faith and credit ... as
they have by law or usage in the courts of such State... from
which they are taken."61
Applying these principles to the facts and procedural history
of the Carino case, the Second Circuit concluded that the FCC
erred by refusing to recognize the conclusive effect of the prior
federal court judgment that gave collateral estoppel effect to the
state court judgment.62 "By incorporating in its regulation a
policy of requiring 'exhaust[ion]' of judicial remedies, the
Commission in effect sought to modify the jurisdiction of Article
57. Deerfield, 992 F.2d at 427-28 (citing U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2).
58. Gordon v. United States, 117 U.S. 697, 702 (1865), quoted in Deerfield, 992
F.2d at 427-28.
59. Deerfield, 992 F.2d at 428; see also United States v. Ferreira, 54 U.S. (13 How.)
40, 49-52 (1851).
60. Deerfield, 992 F.2d at 428.
61. Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1988)).
62. Id. at 429.
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III courts, with respect to any issue of the preemptive effect of
§ 25.104, to deprive them of the power to render anything but
advisory opinions.""
The court found the decision was not unfair to Carino
because he had an opportunity to fully litigate his claim in the
state courts.' Furthermore, the Commission's decision to eschew
immediate agency action could not "alter the constitutional
principle that an agency has no power to review, alter, or prevent
enforcement of the judgment of an Article Ill court.""5 Thus, the
Second Circuit finally concluded that:
by declining to become involved in the controversy over whether
§ 25.104 preempted the Deerfield Ordinance until after the Article
I court proceedings had been completed and insisting that it is
entitled to decide anew questions decided by the courts, the FCC
has in effect attempted (1) to impose on the courts the obligation to
give no opinion on preemption other than one that would be purely
advisory, and/or (2) to arrogate to itself the power to (a) review or
(b) ignore the judgments of the courts. In light of the principles
discussed above, all of these attempts are impermissible as a matter
of law.6
The Second Circuit's conclusions appear to be based upon sound
legal principles that are supported by extensive case law dating
back to the birth of the United States as a nation.
B. The Historical Foundation
In Hayburn's Case,67 the Supreme Court first indicated that
it would apply the case or controversy requirement in circum-
stances where another branch of government places itself in a
position to review decisions of the judicial branch. The Supreme
Court never actually decided such a case. Rather, a majority of
five Justices, in their capacity as circuit judges, expressed a
uniform opinion that a judicial declaration subject to discretionary
63. Id. (alteration in original).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 430.
66. Id.
67. Haybum's Case, 2 U.S. (2 DalU.) 409 (1792).
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suspension by another branch of government constituted an
impermissible advisory opinion.68
At issue in Hayburn 's Case was a congressional act providing
pensions to Revolutionary War veterans and their families.69 The
Act called for the federal circuit courts to make the initial
determination of a veteran's eligibility to receive benefits under
the Act. The courts would certify their decisions to place an
individual on the pension list to the Secretary of War. The
Secretary, however, had authority to withhold a name from the list
if the Secretary suspected "imposition or mistake."'7 A final
decision would then be made by Congress.71 The circuit courts,
in unanimously refusing to enforce the Act, concluded that the Act
required courts merely to give advice, which was beyond the
scope of the courts' constitutional authority.72
Nearly eighty years later, the Supreme Court decided a
similar case for the same reasons in United States v. Ferreira.73
Congress, pursuant to a treaty with Spain, established a forum in
the District Court for the Northern District of Florida to hear
claims for losses by Spanish citizens in Florida.74 Decisions
favorable to the claimants were to be reported to the Secretary of
the Treasury, who would pay the award only if satisfied that it
was just and equitable.75 In Ferreira, an appeal was taken to the
Supreme Court rather than directly to the Secretary. Unlike
Hayburn 's Case, the Supreme Court did not hold that the federal
courts lacked jurisdiction, but only that they were not exercising
68. Id. at 410.
69. Invalid Pensions Act, Act of Mar. 23, 1792, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 243.
70. Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 413.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 410.
73. Ferreira, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 40 (1851).
74. When Congress first set up this forum, the court that was later to decide
Ferreira was a territorial court. Soon thereafter, Florida was admitted to the Union and
the jurisdiction of the territorial court was continued in the new United States district
court. At the time of Ferreira, the court was a United States district court. This
difference in courts, however, would not have altered the holding of the Supreme Court.
Id. at 48-49.
75. Id. at 42.
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judicial power.76 The Court deemed Congress to be within its
treaty powers in establishing the district court as a tribunal for the
resolution of claims." However, when sitting as such a tribunal,
the district court was not exercising judicial power and thus an
appeal to the Supreme Court was not available.78
The FCC's satellite preemption rulemaking and its subsequent
decision in the Deerfield Memorandum Opinion and Order
similarly placed the FCC in a position to review federal court
decisions. Although the FCC did not expressly state that it would
review federal court decisions, as occurred in Hayburn's Case and
Ferreira, such a conclusion was inescapable.79 By concluding
that Carino's claim was not collaterally estopped, the Commission
effectively reversed federal and state court decisions. To the extent
that the FCC was indeed reviewing a federal court's decision, it
violated long-recognized judicial principles.
C. Alternative Theories Available to the Second Circuit
In resolving Deerfield upon the case or controversy ground
sua sponte, the Second Circuit did not give extensive consideration
to other issues deserving discussion. First and foremost among
these issues is the collateral estoppel argument raised by the Town
of Deerfield. Nor did the court discuss Full Faith and Credit,
primary jurisdiction, and exhaustion of administrative remedies.
This section of the Article addresses the role these issues could
have played in Deerfield.
76. Id. at 51.
77. Id. at 46.
78. Id. at 51. The Court drew a distinction between imposing certain duties upon the
courts, as opposed to judges. Id. at 50-51. A duty otherwise impermissible if imposed
on the courts would be permissible if imposed upon a judge. This position was consistent
with the views expressed by a majority of Justices in Hayburn's Case. See also Postum
Cereal Co. v. California Fig Nut Co., 272 U.S. 693 (1927) (holding Supreme Court
lacked jurisdiction to hear appeal from D.C. Circuit because the decision of the D.C.
Circuit was not a judicial action but a mere administrative decision).
79. See Chicago & S. Air Lines v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 333 U.S. 103 (1948);
Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911); Gordon v. United States, 117 U.S. 697
(1865).
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1. Collateral Estoppel
Collateral estoppel was the centerpiece of Deerfield's
challenge to the Commission's decision preempting the Deerfield
ordinance. Deerfield prevailed with that argument earlier in the
federal courts before it was rejected by the Commission in the
Deerfield Memorandum Opinion and Order. The Second Circuit
did not reject collateral estoppel as a basis for its decision. Rather,
it chose to rely principally on case or controversy as the grounds
for its decision.80 It implicitly drew upon collateral estoppel to
the extent the FCC's decision rendered advisory the prior federal
court decision based upon collateral estoppel.
Deerfield had a strong argument for collateral estoppel. The
issues raised in the state court proceedings and the FCC proceed-
ings were precisely the same. The issue was litigated in the first
action before the state courts; the parties were identical; and the
issue was necessarily decided in the state courts by a final
judgment on the merits. Thus, the key elements for invoking issue
preclusion were met.8'
The FCC first declared that collateral estoppel was not
implicated because neither of the prior federal court decisions
addressed whether Carino would be estopped from bringing his
action to the Commission. Technically, the Commission was
correct in arguing that Carino II did not address the application of
collateral estoppel in a case before the Commission. This point
was important because the collateral estoppel effect of a state
court judgment in a subsequent federal administrative proceeding
is an open question. The Second Circuit took the position,
however, that its prior application of collateral estoppel in Carino
II "conclusively resolved the dispute between Carino and Deer-
field."82 The Commission thus erred by not recognizing this
conclusiveness and thereby rendering Carino 11 advisory.
80. Town of Deerfield v. FCC, 992 F.2d 420, 427 (2d Cir. 1993).
81. See 18 CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 4416 (1981 & Supp. 1993); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (1982).
82. Deerfield, 992 F.2d at 429.
[Vol. 46
LOCAL REGULATION PREEMPTION
Second, the FCC declared that even if collateral estoppel
would ordinarily apply, it should not be employed in this case
because of the unfairness exception. The doctrine of collateral
estoppel does not apply when its application would be fundamen-
tally unfair to a party.83 According to the Commission, applying
collateral estoppel would have been unfair to Carino, who was
only following the Commission's directions when he pursued his
judicial remedies before petitioning the Commission.84 The
Second Circuit rejected this argument because Carino had
adequate opportunity to litigate the issue in the state courts and,
regardless, no unfairness could "alter the constitutional principle
that an agency has no power to review, alter, or prevent enforce-
ment of the judgment of an Article III court."85
The Commission could also have relied upon the public
interest exception to the collateral estoppel doctrine. 6 A final
decision that the Deerfield ordinance was not preempted would
have had effects far beyond the Carino backyard. Deerfield would
be free to apply the ordinance to all current and future HSD
owners within its jurisdiction. A separate suit by or against these
other individuals would not be barred by collateral estoppel
because these individuals would not have been in privity with
Carino.87 A non-preemptive outcome of the Deerfield Memo-
randum Opinion and Order, however, might have emboldened
Deerfield's enforcement of its ordinance and cast a chilling effect
upon potential HSD purchasers. Thus, the same interests the
Commission invoked in enacting 47 C.F.R. § 25.104 could also
have formed a basis for not applying collateral estoppel in the
Deerfield case.88 It is questionable, however, whether the Second
Circuit would have recognized this exception in light of the
previous discussion.
83. 18 WRiGHT ET AL., supra note 81, § 4426.
84. Deerfield, 992 F.2d at 426-27.
85. Id. at 429-30.
86. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 28(5)(a) (1982).
87. See generally Federated Dep't Stores v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 398 (1981);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 48 (1982).
88. See supra part I.A.
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The Second Circuit in Deerfield thus did not ignore the
collateral estoppel issue. Rather, it relegated the issue to a
supporting role in the case or controversy argument. The court did
not say that the Commission should have relied on collateral
estoppel but rather that, in failing to give preclusive effect to prior
federal court decisions applying collateral estoppel, the Commis-
sion rendered those earlier decisions merely advisory.89 The court
then proceeded to review and reject the exceptions the Commis-
sion found for not applying collateral estoppel.9°
2. Full Faith and Credit
In Carino's original federal court action (Carino I1), both the
district court and the Second Circuit held that Carino's suit was
barred by collateral estoppel and the Constitution's Full Faith and
Credit Clause.9 Without the constitutional clause, the collateral
estoppel effect of the earlier state court ruling in the federal court
proceeding would have been less certain.
The courts have never fully resolved whether full faith and
credit applies to federal courts or, instead, is limited to the full
faith and credit of one state to another state's judgments. Although
there are federal cases that could be construed to support both
points of view, the more recent decisions seem to hold that the
constitutional doctrine does not apply to federal courts.92 The
issue has never really been decided, however, because Congress,
early in our nation's history, resolved this question by enacting a
statutory full faith and credit provision expressly applicable to
federal courts.93
Thus, when Carino took his case to the federal courts after
fully litigating and losing in New York state court, the federal
89. Deerfield, 992 F.2d at 429.
90. Id. at 429-30.
91. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
92. See, e.g., University of Tenn. v. Elliot, 478 U.S. 788, 799 (1986); Kremer v.
Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 483-84 n.24 (1982); Ultracashmere House, Ltd.
v. Meyer, 664 F.2d 1176, 1183 (11th Cir. 1983). But see American Sur. Co. v. Baldwin,
287 U.S. 156, 166 (1932). See generally 18 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 81, § 4469.




courts were compelled to find that he was collaterally estopped by
giving full faith and credit to the prior New York state court
judgments. That result, however, was certainly not a foregone
conclusion when the same case was presented to the FCC.
Congress enacted Section 1738 long before the proliferation
of federal agencies, and thus Congress did not intend for the
provision to apply specifically to agencies.94 This omission raises
the question of whether collateral estoppel would have applied if
Carino had gone to the FCC directly from state court without
having also sought relief from the federal courts.
The Second Circuit's reliance on case or controversy rather
than collateral estoppel might suggest that the answer to this
question is far from certain. Deerfield argued that the prior state
court decisions should collaterally estop Carino from bringing his
complaint to the Commission.95 The Second Circuit, however,
did not address collateral estoppel in this context. Rather, its
opinion was concerned exclusively with the prior federal court
decisions, which never reached the merits of Carino's complaint.
The case or controversy rationale would not have been applicable
to the prior state court decisions because that provision of the
Constitution solely applies to Article 1I federal courts.96 Only by
applying full faith and credit to federal agencies would collateral
estoppel compel the FCC to honor the prior state court judgments.
The Second Circuit thus may have sought deliberately to
avoid this issue by raising case or controversy sua sponte. The
point is critical here because this factual scenario, where a
complainant comes to the Commission directly from state court,
could very easily arise again and lead to an outcome different
from that reached by the Second Circuit in Deerfield.
3. Primary Jurisdiction
Primary jurisdiction was not directly implicated in Deerfield
but was implicit in the FCC's defense. The FCC argued that it
94. Elliot, 478 U.S. at 794-95.
95. Town of Deerfield v. FCC, 992 F.2d 420, 426-27 (2d Cir. 1993).
96. Id. at 427-28.
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should make the final determination of whether a particular
ordinance is preempted since it has the special expertise in satellite
antenna regulation and a unique understanding of its own
regulations.97 Construing and applying Section 25.104 would be
arguably within the FCC's primary jurisdiction. The Commission
promulgated the rule to foster the development of satellite-
transmitted programming. 8 However, the FCC had clearly
indicated, by requiring exhaustion of local remedies, that it did not
want primary jurisdiction of these proceedings.99
Primary jurisdiction arises when a case is originally cogniza-
ble in the courts but involves factual determinations that require,
or should be resolved according to, agency expertise."0 In such
a case, a court may defer action on an issue within the agency's
primary jurisdiction while allowing the appropriate agency to
dispose of the matter."' The decision of the agency is then
subject to judicial review under normal appellate standards.102
When the plaintiff lacks an assured ability to initiate an
agency action, a court may be reluctant to apply primary jurisdic-
tion.103 If an agency refused to institute proceedings, a court
would be free to resume determination of the case.' Thus, the
FCC effectively waived any primary jurisdiction it may have had
to decide Carino's petition.
97. Id. at 427.
98. Id. at 423.
99. See id.
100. See 5 JACoB A. STEIN ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 47.01 (1993).
101. 5 id.
102. See 5 id. § 47.03. The court of appeals has exclusive jurisdiction to enjoin, set
aside, suspend, or determine the validity of all final orders of the FCC made reviewable
by 47 U.S.C. § 402(a) (1988). 28 U.S.C. § 2342 (1988).
103. 5 STEIN ET AL., supra note 100, § 47.03.
104. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Aircoach Transp. Ass'n, 253 F.2d 877, 886 (D.C. Cir.
1958); see also Chicago Mercantile Exch. v. Deaktor, 414 U.S. 113, 115 (1973); Ricci
v. Chicago Mercantile Exch., 409 U.S. 289,304-05 n.14, 306 (1973). While the Supreme
Court held that certain issues should have been referred to the agency under its primary
jurisdiction, on referral, the agency declined to decide the Ricci case. See Doctrine of
Primary Jurisdiction, Statement Concerning Referrals of Private Litig., Notice, 41 Fed.
Reg. 18,471 (Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 1976).
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4. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
The FCC also precluded the operation of the judicial doctrine
of exhaustion of administrative remedies when it refused to hear
Carino's petition in the first instance. The FCC's policy of
requiring the exhaustion of local remedies effectively blocked one
of the means by which courts defer to agencies.
Exhaustion is most often employed as a prerequisite to
judicial review of agency actions.05 Its purpose is to permit an
agency to determine a case without court interference, thus giving
the court the benefit of agency expertise as well as judicial
economy."0 6 When a plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment in
the courts prior to agency action, however, exhaustion does not
apply. 107
The purposes of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies include (1) promoting judicial economy by requiring
parties to pursue all administrative solutions before seeking
judicial relief, (2) preventing judicial interference in the adminis-
trative process, and (3) allowing courts to benefit from agency
expertise by permitting agencies both to develop a complete
factual record and to render a decision.'0 8
Exhaustion is equivalent to the rule against interlocutory
appeals.0 9 Accordingly, another rationale for the doctrine is to
prevent regulated parties from delaying or obstructing the agency's
ability to conduct an orderly proceeding."0 Exhaustion also
105. See 2 KENNEH C. DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
TREATISE §§ 15.1-.2 (3d ed. 1994).
106. 2 id. § 15.2; see also McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 193-95 (1969).
107. Nehring v. First DeKalb Bancshares, Inc., 692 F.2d 1138, 1142 (7th Cir. 1982).
108. 5 STEIN ET AL., supra note 100, § 49.01.
109. McKart, 395 U.S. at 194.
110. Cf. Public Citizen Health Research Group v. FDA, 740 F.2d 21,29 (D.C. Cir.),
overruled on other grounds, Telecommunications Research & Action Ctr. v. FCC, 750
F.2d 70, 75 (D.C. Cir. 1984), quoted in 5 STEIN Er AL., supra note 100, § 49.01 n.8
(The exhaustion doctrine "ensures that persons do not flout established administrative
processes and thereby advances Congress' intent in establishing the processes; it protects
the autonomy of agency decisionmaking; ... and it serves judicial economy by avoiding
the necessity ... of any judicial involvement if the parties successfully vindicate their
claims before the agency.').
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prevents conflicting resolution of issues by the courts and
agencies,11 ' precisely the problem encountered in the Carino
cases.
Unless restricted or mandated by statute, a court has discre-
tion to apply the exhaustion principle to a case.'12 Usually an
agency's enabling legislation vests it with exclusive initial
responsibility for interpreting and enforcing the statutory provi-
sions pertaining to its jurisdictional subject matter.1 3 There are
exceptions to exhaustion, however, and the courts and agencies
may waive the principle.1 1 4 Immediate court review is available
if the party establishes that the agency clearly exceeded its
authority.115
In the Carino cases, exhaustion would not have been
applicable for at least two reasons. First, no administrative cases
were pending for the courts to defer to in requiring exhaustion of
administrative remedies. Second, the FCC effectively waived the
exhaustion requirement by refusing to hear the case in the first
instance.
III. OPTIONS REMAINING TO THE FCC
Although the Commission's preemption policy received a
setback from the Second Circuit decision in Deerfield, the
Commission is not without options in the continued pursuit of its
goals. To varying degrees, however, these options require trade-
offs between and among the Commission's three goals: (1)
ensuring satellite transmission availability; (2) conserving local
regulations with legitimate health, safety, or aesthetic objectives;
and (3) preserving valuable agency resources. This section surveys
the options, including one that may allow the Commission to
balance effectively all three goals in much the same manner it had
sought prior to the Second Circuit's Deerfield decision.




115. Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184, 188-89 (1958).
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A. Totally Preempt Local Regulations
The easiest and most straightforward response to the Second
Circuit decision is for the FCC to preempt totally all local
regulation of HSDs. This approach would further the federal
policy of making satellite transmissions available to the general
public without involving the Commission in an extensive nation-
wide review of local zoning ordinances.
Total preemption, however, ignores potentially valid health,
safety, or aesthetic objectives underlying many local regulations,
raising questions concerning the validity of total preemption. The
state interest in these issues would have to be weighed against the
competing federal interest.
If total preemption were permissible, the town of Deerfield's
victory in court would indeed have been a Pyrrhic one. In so
vigorously fighting to defend its local ordinance against preemp-
tion rather than attempting to recraft it in a nondiscriminatory
fashion, Deerfield may have forced the FCC to preempt totally a
town's right to place any zoning restrictions upon antennas.
B. Establish Early Precedents for Applying Section 25.104
Taking a compromise approach, the Commission could
quickly accept a number of preemption disputes for determination
and use those cases to establish a line of precedent to guide state
and federal courts in their application of Section 25.104. As cases
with new facts arise, the Commission could accept jurisdiction to
establish additional precedent. Once the Commission believed it
had provided sufficient guidance, it could reimpose its requirement
that petitioners seek relief from local tribunals. This approach's
principal advantage is that it would minimize many courts'
improper application of Section 25.104. Furthermore, local
regulations with legitimate purposes would not be preempted.
The compromise in this approach centers upon the
Commission's role. Instead of preserving for itself the final right
to decide these cases, the Commission would have to decide a
number of cases in the first instance. Thus, the FCC would
become a national zoning board in the early stages of implemen-
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tation. Once it had laid down sufficient precedent, however, the
Commission could significantly reduce, if not eliminate, the cases
it accepts, and return to its policy of exhaustion.
For all this added security, the option would not ensure
against the recurrence of a Carino-type situation. Once the
Commission forgoes its right to decide a case in the first instance,
either by turning away a petition for relief or refusing primary
jurisdiction, it may lose all control over the case. Thus, a decision
of a court, although wrong, would be final and would not be
subject to Commission review.
C. Initiate an Independent Enforcement Proceeding
A third available alternative would allow the Commission to
continue balancing federal and state interests while minimizing the
administrative burdens placed upon the agency. This alternative
would, in effect, retain the requirement that petitioners exhaust
their local remedies while the FCC retains jurisdiction, enabling
the agency to rectify incorrect decisions of federal and state courts
without confronting the case or controversy and collateral estoppel
issues. The approach, explained below, is based on Sections
312(b)116 and 403117 of the Communications Act.
1. A Section 312(b) Proceeding
Section 312(b) provides that:
Where any person (1) has failed to operate substantially as set forth
in a license, (2) has violated or failed to observe any of the
provisions of this chapter, . . . or (3) has violated or failed to
observe any rule or regulation of the Commission authorized by this
chapter or by a treaty ratified by the United States, the Commission
may order such person to cease and desist from such action."
8
Under subpart (3), the FCC is given the express authority to issue
cease and desist orders for violations of its regulations. This would
include violations of 47 C.F.R. § 25.104.
116. 47 U.S.C. § 312(b) (1988).
117. 47 U.S.C. § 403 (1988).
118. 47 U.S.C. § 312(b) (1988).
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It could be argued, however, that because Section 312(b) is
located in Title II of the Act, which deals with radio regulations,
and because Section 312 as a whole is concerned with station
licenses, its application to unlicensed satellite antennas is improp-
er. The legislative history of Section 312(b), however, does not
indicate an express intent to limit its effect to licenses.119
In addition, at least one circuit court has expressly held that
Section 312(b) is not limited to licenses under Title III. In General
Telephone Co. v. FCC, ° the D.C. Circuit squarely faced this
issue. The appellants, various telephone common carriers,
challenged the FCC's issuance of cease and desist orders under
Section 312(b) "as a means of arresting the continued construction
and operation of certain channel distribution systems." ' The
FCC had issued cease and desist orders under Section 312(b) to
prohibit the telephone companies from constructing what amount-
ed to cable television systems.122 The phone companies argued
that, as common carriers regulated under Title II of the Act,
Section 312(b) was not applicable to them."' The court rejected
this argument by looking directly to the language of Section
312(b). The court observed:
Initially, Section 312(b) makes clear that it is directed at "any
person . .. [who] has violated or failed to observe any of the
provisions of this Act . . . [or] any rule or regulation of the
Commission authorized by this Act... ." The pervasive application
of the language employed in Sections 312(b)(2) and 312(b)(3) is
suggested by Section 312(b)(1)'s narrower reference to "any person
[who] has failed to operate substantially as set forth in a license
.. " It seems that when the drafters intended to focus on
licensees, they had no problem doing so. 4
119. H.R. REP. No. 1750, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. § 10 (1952), reprinted in 1952
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2234, 2246-47.
120. General Tel., 413 F.2d 390 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 888 (1969).
121. Id. at 403-04.
122. Id. at 392-93.
123. Id. at 404.
124. Id. (alterations in original) (court's emphasis) (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 312(b)
(1988)).
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No other court has decided to the contrary. Furthermore, the D.C.
Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction to review FCC cease and desist
orders.'25
Thus, under Section 312(b), the Commission could, upon its
own initiative, issue a cease and desist order against any commu-
nity whose zoning regulations violated 47 C.F.R. § 25.104. Such
an order would have a broad effect by prohibiting enforcement
against any person and would not be tailored or addressed to a
specific individual.
2. A Section 403 Proceeding
In conjunction with or independently of Section 312(b), the
FCC may also use Section 403 of the Communications Act to
institute enforcement proceedings against communities violating
47 C.F.R. § 25.104.126 Section 403 authorizes the FCC to:
institute an inquiry, on its own motion, in any case and as to any
matter or thing concerning which complaint is authorized to be
made, to or before the Commission by any provision of this Act, or
concerning which any question may arise under any of the provi-
sions of this Act, or relating to the enforcement of any of the
provisions of this Act. The Commission shall have the same powers
and authority to proceed with any inquiry instituted on its own
motion as though it had been appealed to by complaint or petition
under any of the provisions of this Act, including the power to
make and enforce any order or orders in the case, or relating to the
matter or thing concerning which the inquiry is had, excepting
orders for the payment of money. 7
The plain language clearly contemplates an agency-initiated
enforcement proceeding.1 28 Such a proceeding was also common
under Section 13(2) of the Interstate Commerce Act, from which
Section 403 is derived. 129 Section 403 further enhances the
125. 47 U.S.C. § 402(b)(7) (1988).
126. 47 U.S.C. § 403 (1988).
127. Id.
128. See National Ass'n of Motor Bus Owners v. FCC, 460 F.2d 561, 565 (2d Cir.
1972); Building Material Teamsters Local 282 v. NLRB, 275 F.2d 909, 913 n.2 (2d Cir.
1960).
129. Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, ch. 104, § 13, 24 Stat. 379, 383-84, repealed
by Act of Oct. 17, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-473, § 4(b), 92 Stat. 1337, 1466-70; see In re
Alleged Excessive Freight Rates on Food Products, 4 I.C.C. 116 (In the absence of
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FCC's powers under Section 312(b) and permits the FCC to bring
any action that could have been brought by complaint.1
30
Section 403 would thus appear to give the FCC sufficient
authority to take virtually any action sua sponte that it could take
anywhere else in the Communications Act pursuant to petition or
complaint. This would encompass a petition such as that filed by
Carino and would also provide the necessary statutory authority to
initiate a Section 312(b) cease and desist action on its own motion.
Such action would be in the broad public interest rather than
tailored to the circumstances of an individual complainant.
3. Avoidance of Case or Controversy and Collateral Estoppel
A proceeding to enforce 47 C.F.R. § 25.104 initiated sua
sponte by the FCC, under Section 312(b) or 403 of the Commu-
nications Act, would not encounter the case or controversy and
collateral estoppel problems raised in the Carino cases because
such a proceeding would involve different parties and thus would
be a distinct and independent proceeding.13' Furthermore, collat-
eral estoppel should not apply because the FCC would not have
been a party in the earlier court proceedings and because the
government's interest is broader than that of a single individual.
Application of collateral estoppel requires (1) a final
judgment on the merits in the prior case in which the issues were
actually litigated and necessarily resolved, (2) that the parties be
identical to or in privity with the parties in the prior case, and (3)
that the issue be the same in both actions.'32 A set of facts
similar to those in the Carino cases would implicate the first and
third elements of collateral estoppel. However, if the Commission
were to initiate, on its own motion, a proceeding under Sections
complaint by others the Commission must, if it is to enforce the law, proceed on its own
motion.).
130. 47 U.S.C. § 403 (1988).
131. See Carino v. Town of Deerfield, 750 F. Supp. 1156 (N.D.N.Y. 1990), aff'd, 940
F.2d 649 (2d Cir. 1991); Carino v. Pilon, 530 N.Y.S.2d 1022 (App. Div.), appeal
dismissed, 531 N.E.2d 655 (N.Y. 1988); Deerfield Memorandum Opinion and Order,
supra note 47. However, a relevant federal or state court ruling against an HSD owner
would still be in force and unaffected.
132. Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153 (1979).
Number 3]
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL
312(b) or 403 of the Communications Act, there would be no
identity of parties and probably no privity. It would be very
difficult to argue that the FCC is in privity with individual
plaintiffs in earlier court proceedings, especially if the FCC does
not participate in any way in the prior cases. Additionally, because
the FCC represents the broader public interest, its position cannot
adequately be represented by individual complainants who reflect
only their own interests. Thus, the second prerequisite for the
application of collateral estoppel would not be satisfied.
To be sure, identity of parties or privity is not an absolute
requirement of collateral estoppel;133 the Supreme Court has
upheld the application of a type of collateral estoppel known as
non-mutual collateral estoppel.134 Nevertheless, the Court has
also recognized that non-mutual collateral estoppel should not
usually be applied against the government 135 because "'the
Government is not in a position identical to that of a private
litigant,' both because of the geographic breadth of Government
litigation and also, most importantly, because of the nature of the
issues the Government litigates. 136
As a corollary to this rule, it is well-settled that the United
States will not be barred from independent litigation by the failure
of a private plaintiff.137 This rule emerged most prominently in
two contexts, the Voting Rights Act of 1965138 and Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) complaints, but has
not been limited to these areas.
133. Wilder v. Thomas, 854 F.2d 605, 617 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S.
1053 (1989).
134. See Blonder-Tongue Lab. v. University of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313 (1971).
135. See United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 158-60 (1984). But see Montana,
440 U.S. at 155 (finding privity where the United States essentially controlled the prior
litigation even though it was not a party).
136. Mendoza, 464 U.S. at 159 (quoting INS v. Hibi, 414 U.S. 5, 8 (1973) (per
curiam) (citation omitted)).
137. See United States v. East Baton Rouge Parish Sch. Bd., 594 F.2d 56, 58-59 &
n.6 (5th Cir. 1979); see also City of Richmond v. United States, 422 U.S. 358 (1975);
Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106 (1963); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 41
cmt. d (1982).
138. 47 U.S.C. § 1973c (1988).
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In City of Richmond v. United States, the federal government,
under the Voting Rights Act of 1965, challenged the annexation
of certain surrounding communities by the City of Richmond,
Virginia. 139 The Voting Rights Act of 1965 prohibited such
action unless either (1) approved by the Attorney General or the
Attorney General failed to act within sixty days, or (2) the U.S.
District Court for the District of Columbia had issued a declarato-
ry judgment that the action "does not have the purpose and will
not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on
account of race or color." 1
40
Pending review by the Attorney General, Curtis Holt, a
private plaintiff, commenced a suit in the Eastern District of
Virginia challenging the annexation under the Fifteenth Amend-
ment. 41 The district court held that the annexation had an illegal
racial purpose.1 42 The Fourth Circuit reversed the lower court,
however, and found that Richmond had valid reasons for the
annexation. 43 The City of Richmond subsequently filed suit in
the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia seeking a
declaratory judgment approving the annexation.' 44 That suit
eventually came before the Supreme Court.141
Richmond contended before the district court that the Fourth
Circuit's prior finding of no unlawful purpose should be given
estoppel effect on the question of the purpose behind the annex-
ation.146 The district court refused, citing various grounds, and
instead concluded that the annexation was adopted by Richmond
with a discriminatory racial purpose. 47 On appeal, the Supreme
Court upheld the district court's conclusion and further stated,
139. City of Richmond, 422 U.S. 358, 362 (1975).
140. Id. at 361-62 (quoting Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1965)).
141. Holt v. City of Richmond, 334 F. Supp. 228 (E.D. Va. 1971), rev'd, 459 F.2d
1093 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 931 (1972).
142. Id. at 237.
143. Holt v. City of Richmond, 459 F.2d 1093, 1099-100 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 408
U.S. 931 (1972).
144. City of Richmond v. United States, 376 F. Supp. 1344 (D.D.C. 1974), vacated,
422 U.S. 358 (1975).
145. City of Richmond v. United States, 422 U.S. 358 (1975).
146. City of Richmond, 376 F. Supp. at 1352 n.43.
147. Id.
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"Whatever the merits of the District Court's position on this
collateral-estoppel issue, we find controlling the nonparticipation
of the United States and the Attorney General in the Holt I
case."
148
City of Richmond formed the basis for an even stronger
opinion by the Fifth Circuit in United States v. East Baton Rouge
Parish School Board.49 This case, also arising under the Voting
Rights Act of 1965, followed an earlier challenge in 1975 by black
residents of the parish asserting violations of their voting rights.
Their case was dismissed for failure to state a claim and the
dismissal was affirmed by the Fifth Circuit.
1 50
In the suit brought by the United States, the district court held
that the United States was barred by the unsuccessful prior
litigation of the private plaintiffs and by the failure of the Attorney
General to object to the plan when submitted for his approval
under 42 U.S.C. § 1973c.15 1
The Fifth Circuit, in a brief and pointed opinion, reversed the
district court's conclusion, finding it to be
directly contrary to the general principle of law that the United
States will not be barred from independent litigation by the failure
of a private plaintiff. This principle is based primarily upon the
recognition that the United States has an interest in enforcing
federal law that is independent of any claims of private citizens
.... Also, any contrary rule would impose an onerous and
extensive burden upon the United States to monitor private litigation
in order to ensure that possible mishandling of a claim by a private
plaintiff could be corrected by intervention.'52
A similar case arose in United States v. Texas. 153 The
government challenged voter registration procedures that had
successfully withstood challenges by private plaintiffs in two prior
148. City of Richmond, 422 U.S. at 373 n.6; see also City of Port Arthur v. United
States, 517 F. Supp. 987, 1004 n. 119 (D.D.C. 1981) (holding that the non-participation
of United States in prior case was fatal to operation of estoppel), aff'd, 459 U.S. 159
(1982).
149. East Baton Rouge Parish Sch. Bd., 594 F.2d 56 (5th Cir. 1979).
150. Bryant v. East Baton Rouge Parish Sch. Bd., 471 F.2d 651 (5th Cir. 1973).
151. See East Baton Rouge Parish Sch. Bd., 594 F.2d at 59-60.
152. Id. at 58 (citations omitted).
153. Texas, 430 F. Supp. 920 (S.D. Tex. 1977).
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suits."5 4 The district court refused to apply res judicata, finding
that the United States was not in privity with the two prior plain-
tiffs.'55 The court found that the government had a broader
interest than the private plaintiffs because it represented the voting
rights of all persons who were required to adhere to the challenged
voter registration procedures.'56
In a case similar to Carino, the Sixth Circuit held that the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission was not barred from
relitigating issues resolved in prior litigation by a private par-
ty.l"7 Based on charges filed by Allen Brown, Jr., against his
employer, McLean Trucking, the EEOC commenced a suit in U.S.
district court to enforce Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.' Subsequently, Brown filed a separate action against
McLean, which was later dismissed in connection with a compro-
mise settlement between the parties.'59 The EEOC suit was then
dismissed by the district court, which concluded that the case was
barred by resolution and dismissal of Brown's separate suit against
his employer. 160 The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that the
EEOC sued to vindicate a public interest that is broader than the
interests of the complaining parties.
16 1
The public interest represented by the government extends
beyond the Voting Rights Act and the Civil Rights Act. The
Seventh Circuit made this quite clear in Secretary of Labor v.
Fitzsimmons.162 After citing many of the same cases discussed
154. Id. at 923.
155. Id. at 926.
156. Id. at 925.
157. EEOC v. McLean Trucking Co., 525 F.2d 1007 (6th Cir. 1975).
158. Id. at 1008; see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1988).
159. McLean Trucking, 525 F.2d at 1008.
160. Id. at 1009.
161. Id. at 1010; See EEOC v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 511 F.2d 1352 (6th Cir. 1977),
(principles of collateral estoppel or res judicata did not render charges alleging
presettlement events unavailable as basis for EEOC suit), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 994
(1975). But see EEOC v. Continental Oil Co., 548 F.2d 884 (10th Cir. 1977) (rejecting
EEOC's right to sue despite previous private action); Johnson v. Nekoosa-Edwards Paper
Co., 558 F.2d 841 (8th Cir. 1977) (holding that court must consider EEOC's obligation
to attempt conciliation).
162. Fitzsimmons, 805 F.2d 682 (7th Cir. 1986).
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herein, the court stated that "the government's special status in
enforcing the public interest extends beyond those statutes that
implicate underlying constitutional concerns as in the Voting
Rights Act and Title VII.' 63 The court cited antitrust cases as
one example, before proceeding to recognize another such interest
in enforcement of ERISA.' 64 In Donovan v. Cunningham,165
the Fifth Circuit held that the rule that separate, private litigation
does not preclude government actions seeking judicial enforcement
of federal statutes "is based primarily upon the recognition that the
United States has an interest in enforcing federal law that is
independent of any claims of private citizens.' ' 166 Thus, the court
recognized a difference in those cases where a plaintiff seeks relief
only for himself and those where the government seeks to
determine the legality of specific conduct and prevent this conduct
from causing any future loss.
The FCC, by instituting a Section 312(b) or Section 403
action, would be pursuing the broad public interest. It would be
issuing a declaratory judgment preempting enforcement of the
cited ordinance against any individual-not just prior unsuccessful
plaintiffs. The Commission need not have an actual complainant
because, as an administrative agency, it is not bound by the
Constitution's Case or Controversy Clause. 167 The FCC would
163. Id. at 692.
164. Id. (citing Sam Fox Publishing Co. v. United States, 366 U.S. 683 (1961)).
165. Donovan, 716 F.2d 1455 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1251 (1984).
166. Id. at 1462; see also Beck v. Levering, 947 F.2d 639 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding
judgment in prior case does not establish claim preclusion for related action by Secretary
of Labor seeking public relief), cert. denied sub nom. Levy v. Martin, 112 S. Ct. 1937
(1992); FTC v. AMREP Corp., 705 F. Supp. 119 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (holding res judicata
applied to prior plaintiffs who settled, but FTC could still maintain suit on behalf of
plaintiffs who opted out of class and in the general public interest); Loving v. Alexander,
548 F. Supp. 1079 (W.D. Va. 1982) (holding federal government not bound by
determination, made in state court litigation by private parties, that a river is not
navigable), afd, 745 F.2d 861 (4th Cir. 1984).
167. 4 STEIN ET AL., supra note 100, § 33.04 n.3 (citing Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co.
v. Federal Power Comm'n, 606 F.2d 1373, 1380 (D.C. Cir. 1979) ("The subject matter
of agencies' jurisdiction naturally is not confined to cases and controversies inasmuch
as agencies are creatures of article I. ... Thus, the Commission correctly observes that
an agency may, if authorized by statute, issue an advisory opinion or abstract declaration
without regard to the existence of an actual controversy.")).
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not be collaterally estopped by prior unsuccessful private litigants
because it represents the broad public interest. Furthermore,
because a suit by the FCC would be a different case with different
parties, prior federal court judgments to the contrary would not be
merely advisory. 168
The fact that the FCC's determination would also benefit
prior unsuccessful private plaintiffs, such as Carino, is irrelevant.
In EEOC v. McLean Trucking Co., the EEOC was barred from
relitigating a suit on behalf of an individual complainant who had
entered into a final settlement with a defendant in a prior suit.169
The EEOC was permitted, however, to litigate against the
defendant in the public interest. 7 The court recognized that
[w]hile under our holding Brown [plaintiff in the prior suit] is not
to recover any "private benefit", such as back pay, not granted to
him under the compromise settlement of the separate action,...
Brown should not and cannot practically be prevented from
enjoying the benefits inuring generally to all McLean employees as
the result of the eradication of any unlawful practices which may be
proved to exist or the benefit of improvements in working condi-
tions.
71
Thus, the fact that an unsuccessful court complainant, like Carino,
would benefit from a favorable FCC decision does not prohibit the
FCC from taking action in the public interest.
Furthermore, the FCC's refusal to decide a case initially
should not bar it from becoming involved at a later time. This can
be inferred from United States v. East Baton Rouge Parish School
Board, in which the United States was not estopped from initiating
a subsequent action after an unsuccessful private action, even after
the Attorney General's failure to exercise a statutory right to
object to the challenged action. 72
This result also occurred when the government had opportu-
nity and notice to intervene in a case. In Kerr-McGee Chemical
168. Prior contrary federal court judgments would be no more advisory than are
conflicting decisions of other courts-federal or state.
169. McLean Trucking, 525 F.2d 1007, 1010 (6th Cir. 1975).
170. Id.
171. Id. at 1011 (citation omitted).
172. East Baton Rouge Parish Sch. Bd., 594 F.2d 56, 58 (5th Cir. 1979).
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Corp. v. Hartigan,173 the state of Illinois, despite its appearance
as an amicus curiae in the prior litigation, was not estopped "from
litigating an issue on behalf of the people merely because the issue
has previously been litigated by private parties in an action to
which the state was not a party."' 74
One factor in particular distinguishes the Carino cases from
the cases in this section. The cases discussed in this section
involved judicial suits filed by the United States or an agency after
an adverse resolution against, or a settlement by, private plaintiffs.
These cases did not involve a proceeding initiated by an agency
sua sponte after deliberately passing up the opportunity to decide
the issue for itself. Many of the cases, however, are analogous in
that the government passed up an opportunity to intervene in the
earlier judicial proceeding.
Nevertheless, this distinction should not be significant. No
rational basis exists for refusing to apply the enunciated standards
regarding the public interest. Furthermore, part of the standard
litany in these cases is that the government has limited resources
and cannot be expected to monitor private litigation in order to
intervene to correct a private plaintiffs mishandling of a
claim. 17' This concern closely parallels the FCC's concern that
it not become a national zoning board. 176 Just as the government
does not abandon the public's interest by not intervening in every
judicial case, the FCC should not be held to have abandoned the
public interest by refusing jurisdiction, in the first instance, of a
case involving a private plaintiff.
CONCLUSION
After the Deerfield decision, the Federal Communications
Commission might seem to be on the horns of a dilemma. If the
Commission is to pursue its statutory goal of protecting the rights
of Americans to receive satellite-delivered signals, must it totally
173. Kerr-McGee, 816 F.2d 1177 (7th Cir. 1987).
174. Id. at 1181.
175. See East Baton Rouge Parish Sch. Bd., 594 F.2d at 58.
176. See supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text.
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preempt all local regulation of satellite antennas? Or, at the other
extreme, will the FCC become a national zoning board overseeing
the implementation of local ordinances and regulations? The
former option would override even narrowly tailored restrictions
with legitimate health, safety, or aesthetic objectives, while the
latter would significantly strain Commission resources.
In a perfect world, the FCC could hope to apply a short form
of the second option: intervene early and often in local disputes
and trust that their resolution, according to correct interpretations
of the partial preemption in Section 25.104, would thereafter be
followed as precedent by local forums. In our less-than-perfect
world, however, there are no guarantees against repetition of the
Carino travails.
The Deerfield decision, nevertheless, may not be irreconcil-
able with the Commission's preference for local resolution of
antenna zoning disputes. The federal agency may simply need to
restructure its procedures to accomplish the same goals sought
under the former policy of exhaustion of local remedies. Rather
than decide precisely the same case previously resolved by a state
or federal court, the Commission could issue a cease and desist
order pursuant to Section 312(b) of the Communications Act or
institute its own investigation or complaint proceeding under
Section 403. Such proceedings would be instituted in the broad
public interest, rather than through a fixed set of facts reflecting
private or parochial aims.
Thus, the FCC should not hastily conclude that it can only
enforce Section 25.104 through the extreme measures of total
preemption or national zoning enforcement. There is another
alternative that recognizes the legitimate objectives of municipal
zoning regulations while allowing the Commission to correct local
administrative or judicial misinterpretations of Section 25.104.
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